# SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) worth $4,913 | My Highest Bounty Ever !

Hi Everyone! ,

Hope you’re doing well , today I am doing another write-up about one of my best findings and my highest bounty ever. It’s an SSRF — Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability I discovered in [Dropbox Bug Bounty Program.](https://hackerone.com/dropbox/)

On First Glance , Dropbox Program looked very interesting to me as it was having best payout and good response time , so I choose to hunt on Hellosign mentioned on Dropbox Bug Bounty Program’s Policy.

I started hunting on main application at app.hellosign.com , I found that there was a feature of importing document from Dropbox , GDrive , BOX , OneDrive , EverNote. At this point SSRF came up in my mind already , so I started with Dropbox Import Feature , I saw the following request :-

![](https://cdn.hashnode.com/res/hashnode/image/upload/v1716117084181/13076ae1-8506-45fe-b5eb-8415b8bd9850.png align="left")

I changed the value of `file_reference` parameter to my burp collaborator URL , But I got `404` 😫 , at this point I thought they already have SSRF Protection there , I gave up and closed my P.C

On Next Day with fresh mind , I thought to Dig-In Again and I tried with OneDrive Feature and I saw this request :-

```http
GET /attachment/externalFile?service_type=O&file_reference=MYONEDRIVEFILELINKHERE&file_name=FILENAME.ANYTHING&c=0.8261955039214062 HTTP/1.1
Host: app.hellosign.com
Connection: close
Accept: application/json
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_2) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.111 Safari/537.36
X-CSRF-Token:
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: REDACTED
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,hi;q=0.7
Cookie:REDACTED
```

You’ll see that above request is having a service\_type paramter value `O` which means onedrive it’s making it different from the first request which is from dropbox and having `D`in that parameter. Now value of `file_reference` parameter changed to my collaborator link and luckily i got a ping this time.

After this a PDF got generated on HelloSign which contained the content of my collaborator page. At this moment I got too much happy 😍

Now I moved to get localhost content , At first I checked which cloud service they’re using on [whatismyipaddress.com](http://whatismyipaddress.com) , I found that they're using AWS/EC2 , So tried getting [`http://169.254.169.254/latest/`](http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data) , But I got :-

`404 Not Found`

Sadly Request Didn’t Go through , Now I tried [http://127.0.0.1](http://127.0.0.1) , that too got the same response.

<iframe src="https://giphy.com/embed/WIAxZtUxUY000/twitter/iframe" width="435" height="251"></iframe>

Now I got lil sad but I tried to find more ways through Hackerone Hacktivity and Found this GEM Report :- [https://hackerone.com/reports/247680](https://hackerone.com/reports/247680) where reporter used `303` Redirect to Bypass SSRF Protection.

I quickly hosted the following code on my server :-

Now I tried again with my server redirect link and Finally!!! I got the content of AWS Instance (Metadata) 😍 😍 😍

![AWS METADATA CONTENT](https://cdn.hashnode.com/res/hashnode/image/upload/v1716117085662/2a3ea8e2-3323-4e61-aadf-7c1e8f118c1a.png align="left")

Now I got too much happy and shocked too as found full read SSRF on one of the biggest and best bug bounty programs around the world, I was able to retrieve everything from AWS metadata like access\_keys, tokens, etc.

I reported the bug immediately and It got triaged in 3 hours :)

![](https://cdn.hashnode.com/res/hashnode/image/upload/v1716117086874/f7d963fc-4ef0-4d2c-a9a9-0f77b30f47c0.png align="left")

![](https://cdn.hashnode.com/res/hashnode/image/upload/v1716117088088/0264b152-9b1f-4502-92e7-bae0ba5d752d.png align="left")

It was the happiest moment for me. 😄 😄 😄

Now Team asked me to check if RCE was possible there or not. I got the access key , token and Tried Executing this commands:- AWS ec2 stop-instances — instance-ids intsanceidhere , But it didn’t worked as that role was not having enough permissions to execute the command.

But I was still too happy and was excited for Bounty 😙

Finally, on the 9th Day, Dropbox Rewarded me with $4913

![](https://cdn.hashnode.com/res/hashnode/image/upload/v1716117089316/9089a1c6-5161-4f6c-adab-06b86e9c57b8.png align="left")

It was all about my first SSRF and the highest bounty till now. 😄

If you have questions and anything about the post you want to ask me, please contact me via [Twitter (ehsayaan)](https://twitter.com/ehsayaan) My DMs are always open.

*Kudos to*[*Sean(zseano)*](https://twitter.com/zseano)*,*[*Sam Curry*](https://twitter.com/samwcyo)*,*[*Jenish Sojitra*](https://twitter.com/_jensec)*and*[*Shubham Patel*](https://twitter.com/Shubham_4500)*for reviewing this blog.*

*Special thanks to Dropbox Security Team for helping me throughout the whole process.*

### Until Next Time!

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